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IN

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

V.

NO. 47120-2019

)
)

Ada County Case No.

)

CR01-18-60657

)

SHAY RYAN ALEXANDER,

)
)

Defendant-Appellant.

RESPONDENT’ S BRIEF

)
)

IS SUE

Has Alexander

failed t0 establish that the district court

abused

its

discretion

by imposing

a uniﬁed sentence 0f 15 years, with four years ﬁxed, upon his guilty plea t0 aggravated battery?

ARGUMENT
Alexander Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused
A.

Its

Sentencing Discretion

Introduction

On March 20,

2018, Alexander “hit and strangled” his girlfriend, Sara, While his 14-year-

old son “was present and could hear the altercation.”

(PSI, pp. 103, 1072 (page citations to

electronic filed named “Conf.Docs.-Alex”).)

Sara reported that Alexander “came into the

bedroom and punched her in the face,” “kneed” her in the chest, and then held her down and
“continued to hit her.” (PSI, pp. 918, 1072.) He subsequently “strangled her approximately 4
times with both hands” while “telling her she was a whore and that was what whore’s [sic] got.”
(PSI, p. 103.) He also “hit her with a vacuum at some point.” (PSI, p. 103.) Sara told police
that Alexander had battered her “three times before but this was the first time she reported the
abuse.” (PSI, p. 1072.) Officers noted that Sara “had redness to her neck and chest, bruises on
both arms, and a broken finger nail on her right hand.” (PSI, p. 1072.) Sara was treated at the
hospital, where x-rays revealed that she had “[o]ld healing rib fractures” and what was suspected
to be a “new nondisplaced sternal fracture.” (PSI, p. 922.)
On August 6, 2018, Alexander “asked [Sara] for some drugs” and, when she told him she
“didn’t have access to any drugs,” he “became very aggressive,” “started yelling at her and
eventually grabbed a large, thick wine bottle. He then came after her with it … and hit her over
the head with it.” (PSI, pp. 946-47.) Alexander “pushed her around as well and she received a
small cut on her right hand as a result.” (PSI, p. 947.) When officers responded, Sara told them
that she “was in fear for her life and that she believed [Alexander] is going to kill her if he isn’t
stopped.” (PSI, p. 946.)
On December 25, 2018, Alexander “punched [Sara] repeatedly in the left side while she
was driving,” “which caused her spleen to rupture.” (PSI, p. 10-11.) He then “drove Sara home
and dropped her off.” (PSI, p. 12.) Sara subsequently contacted a friend, who took her to the
hospital emergency room. (PSI, p. 12) Medical staff determined that Sara had massive internal
bleeding with “class 4 hemorrhagic shock” and she required immediate surgery to stop the
bleeding. (PSI, pp. 1010, 1072.) Sara received a blood transfusion and was “rushed into the
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operating room,” where she underwent an exploratory laparotomy and her spleen was removed.
(PSI, pp. 12, 1261.) During her surgery, Sara developed “severe” hypothermia and “resultant
coagulopathy”; consequently, her “abdomen was kept open” and she was “transported to the
Surgical Intensive Care Unit in critical condition” for “rewarming and further resuscitation.”
(PSI, pp. 1012, 1261.) Sara “was rewarmed over the next day,” after which she underwent a
second surgery and “abdominal wound closure.” (PSI, pp. 283-84, 1261-62.)
On December 26, 2018, officers located Alexander at a Motel 6.

(PSI, p. 1072.)

Alexander “attempted to elude police” and was apprehended after he “toss[ed] a backpack into
the bed of a pickup truck” and “jumped from the motel window.” (PSI, p. 1072.) Inside
Alexander’s motel room, officers observed an “empty Dr. Pepper 12 pack box with a plastic bag
with white substance on the bottom, an orange glass pipe and 2 pieces of vinyl plastic tubing,”
and a “propane torch bottle.” (PSI, pp. 24-25.) Upon searching Alexander’s backpack, officers
found glass “drug pipes with burned residue in them,” a “safe with a four-digit roller
combination,” and “a small plastic baggy containing numerous white pill tablets with the number
85 stamped on them.” (PSI, pp. 22-23.)
The state charged Alexander with “domestic violence in the presence of a child … or in
the alternative aggravated battery,” attempted strangulation, two counts of aggravated battery,
possession of methamphetamine, possession of drug paraphernalia, and misdemeanor violation
of a no contact order. (Aug., pp. 1-3.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Alexander pled guilty to
one count of aggravated battery, possession of methamphetamine, and violation of a no contact
order, and the state dismissed the remaining charges. (R., p. 36.) The district court imposed
concurrent unified sentences of 15 years, with four years fixed, for aggravated battery; five
years, with two years fixed, for possession of methamphetamine; and 60 days of jail time, with
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60 days “already served,” for Violation of a no contact order.

credit for

Alexander ﬁled a notice of appeal timely from the judgment of conviction.
Alexander

asserts that the district court

abused

its

(R., pp. 64-66.)

“When

discretion

57-62.)

(R., pp.

it

imposed a uniﬁed

sentence 0f ﬁfteen years, with four years ﬁxed, upon [him], following his guilty plea[s] to

aggravated battery, possession 0f a controlled substance, and Violation 0f a n0 contact order.”

Because Alexander has already served his

(Appellant’s brief, p. 3.)
for Violation of a

Idaho

moot

it

order,

any challenge

to that sentence is moot.

232 P.3d 327, 329 (2010) (quotations and

6, 8,

if

n0 contact

As

relief”).

may

such, Alexander

Standard

“An
sentence

is

illegal, the

clear abuse of discretion.”

2017).

Idaho

1, 8,

sentence

was

is

State V. Barclay, 149

(“An

issue

becomes

an abuse 0f discretion.

based 0n an abuse of discretion standard. Where a

show

that

State V. Bonilla, 161 Idaho 902, 905,

the defendant

excessive, considering any

it is

must show

View 0f the

the time of sentencing that

conﬁnement

protecting society and t0 achieve any 0r
retribution applicable t0 a given case.”

The

differing weights

district court

when

unreasonable and, thus, a

392 P.3d 1243, 1246
that in light

facts.”

368 P.3d 621, 628 (2016). “A sentence of conﬁnement

App. 2018).

sentence

capable 0f being concluded

failed t0 establish

appellant has the burden t0

“To show an abuse 0f discretion,

criteria, the

jail

Of Review

appellate review of a sentence

not

is

60-day

challenge only his sentences for aggravated battery

and possession of methamphetamine. Alexander has

B.

citations omitted)

does not present a real and substantial controversy that

by judicial

entire

is

(Ct.

App.

of the governing

State V. McIntosh, 160

reasonable if

it

appears at

is

necessary t0 accomplish the primary objective 0f

all

of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, 0r

State V. Reed, 163 Idaho 681,

417 P.3d 1007, 1013

(Ct.

has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them

deciding upon the sentence. McIntosh, 160 Idaho at

9,

368 P.3d

at 629.

“In deference t0 the

trial

judge, this Court will not substitute

Where reasonable minds might

differ.”

Li. at 8,

368 P.3d

Idaho 139, 148-49, 191 P.3d 217, 226-27 (2008)).
limits prescribed

trial

by

View of a reasonable sentence

628 (quoting State

V.

Stevens, 146

Furthermore, “[a] sentence ﬁxed Within the

the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion

court.” Li. (quoting State V. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90,

Alexander Has Shown

C.

at

its

by

the

645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).

N0 Abuse Of The District Court’s

Discretion

Application of these legal standards to the facts of this case shows n0 abuse 0f discretion.

At

sentencing, the district court articulated the correct legal standards applicable to

(T12, p. 18, Ls. 6-14; p. 19, L.

20 —

p. 20, L. 13.)

The

its

decision.

district court “t[ook] seriously the

savage

nature of this abuse,” and “consider[ed] primarily the protection of the community, in particular
the Victim in this case or

19, Ls. 12-16.)

is,

frankly, as

The defendant brutalized

the bench.

did this

“This

anybody with

whom

the defendant

bad a domestic Violence case

(Tr., p. 18, L.

Whether Alexander posed an undue risk to reoffend

am

shows he’s a high

The

district court also

risk to

commit

this type

on

that

22 —

have seen in

if placed in the

p. 19, L. 1.)

my years

0n

He

In considering

community, the

(Tr., p. 20, Ls. 2-4.)

that

of crime again.” (Tn,

The

to the point

district court

district court

p. 19, L.

22 —

p. 20,

L

1.)

0f hospitalization has not been enough to

concluded Alexander “clearly

is

in

need 0f

can best be provided in an in-custody environment Where he can focus solely

and Where he can’t hurt anybody during

The court

I

expressed concern “because this wasn’t a one-time incident, this has been

ongoing behavior. Brutalizing the Victim

treatment

as

p.

concerned, signiﬁcantly, particularly in light 0f the domestic Violence evaluation

that

stop him.”

be in a relationship.” (TL,

[H]e beat her nearly t0 death.

the Victim in this case.

more than once, on multiple occasions.”

stated, “I

may

that time

also found that “the lethality of these actions

is

of treatment.”

(TL, p. 20, Ls. 5-9.)

overriding” (Tr., p. 19, Ls. 18-19), and

that “these crimes, frankly, given the damage inflicted, require a significant response in terms of
punishment. I believe that anything other than a strong response would underscore, underplay or
depreciate the seriousness of these crimes” (Tr., p. 20, Ls. 9-13).
The district court’s analysis is supported by the record. Alexander’s actions in the instant
offense were truly egregious. He punched the victim repeatedly, “‘so hard it shattered [her]
spleen’” and she was “‘bleeding to death.’” (PSI, pp. 12, 1304.) He then dropped her off at her
home, and she had to call a friend to take her to the hospital. (PSI, p. 12.) Sara had “severe
abdominal pain” (PSI, p. 1011) and she told hospital staff that she was “cold and felt like she was
dying” (PSI, p. 1224). Hospital notes indicate that Sara was in critical condition, “with a high
probability of imminent or life-threatening decompensation and deterioration.” (PSI, pp. 100203.) Additionally, medical staff observed that Sara was “obviously cold, extremely pale, shaking
with rigors,” her abdomen was “rigid” and “distended,” and she was “in obvious distress, in
hemorrhagic shock” and “in extremis,” or near death. (PSI, pp. 1224-25.)
Sara told the presentence investigator that, “[a]s a result of the surgery necessary to save
her life, the last six months ‘have been hell.’ I have problems going to the bathroom and I can’t
eat normally.’” (PSI, p. 1073.) Sara stated that she “had financial problems because she was
physically unable to work” and she “did not feel she could afford the medications she needed for
daily functioning.” (PSI, p. 1073.) She advised that she has had “‘physical, emotional, and
mental’ issues since this assault and surgery” and that she now has “difficulty sleeping or feeling
safe.” (PSI, p. 1073.) Sara reported that she is “‘extremely scared of [Alexander],’” that he had
battered her on approximately seven prior occasions, and that he would also follow her, “‘chase
[her] down,’” and/or “‘lock [her] in his house.’” (PSI, p. 1305.)
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The presentence investigator reported that Alexander poses a “high risk” to reoffend and
that he “was not considered an appropriate candidate for probation,” noting that Alexander
“demonstrated a disturbing pattern of aggression and abuse” and “appeared to make no efforts to
address substance abuse and anger problems on his own.” (PSI, p. 1089.) The domestic
violence evaluator likewise determined that Alexander poses a high risk for future domestic
violence, and that his “Predicted recidivism” rate is “74%.” (PSI, pp. 1299-1300.)
The record supports the district court’s conclusions that Alexander presents a danger to
the community, that he has not previously been deterred from his ongoing violent behavior, that
he needs treatment that will best be provided in a structured environment, and that the serious
and potentially lethal nature of the offense required a significant response in terms of
punishment.
On appeal, Alexander argues that “the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive aggregate sentence” because he abused drugs, was willing to participate in treatment,
had support from his family, and stated “that he felt ‘horrible’ about hurting his ex-girlfriend.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 3-8 (quoting PSI, pp. 1074, 1086).) Although Alexander claims that he
“was under the influence of methamphetamine when he committed the aggravated battery”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 5), he made conflicting statements during his domestic violence evaluation
(PSI, p. 1297). He told the domestic violence evaluator that he knew he “‘wasn’t high’” on the
day of the aggravated battery and that he “‘didn’t remember using meth the night before,’”
either. (PSI, p. 1297.) Alexander further stated, “‘I don’t think the drug had anything to do with
it,’” explaining that “‘it was more that we didn’t have it. … I was rock bottom, I had nothing. It
was Christmas and I didn’t have a cent to my name,’” and “‘I think everything bunched up and I
lashed out.’” (PSI, pp. 1297-98.) With respect to Alexander’s purported regret and acceptance
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0f responsibility, the domestic Violence evaluator reported that Alexander minimized his Violent
actions

When

describing the offense, that his “description of prior Violence to [Sara]”

was

also

“signiﬁcantly minimized,” and his “statements 0f accountability are not comprehensive, making
his remorse partial as well.”

(PSI, p. 1306.)

Furthermore,

when Alexander was asked whether

he needed treatment for his domestic Violence issues, his response was indifferent — he
don’t think

it

would

purpose back in

hurt.

my life. 3”

I

don’t

know

am

I

(PSI, p. 1298.)

sober now.

I

stated,

don’t think that way,

I

“‘1

have

Alexander’s arguments d0 not establish an abuse 0f

sentencing discretion.

Alexander’s sentence

is

appropriate in light 0f the egregiousness 0f the Offense, his

repeated acts of Violence toward the Victim, and his high risk t0 reoffend.

demonstrated that the

district court

abused

its

discretion

When

it

Alexander has not

determined that an aggregate

uniﬁed sentence of 15 years, With four years ﬁxed, was necessary

t0

meet the goals 0f

sentencing.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

DATED this

Court t0 afﬁrm Alexander’s conviction and sentence.

10th day of December, 2019.

_/s/

Kenneth K. Jorgensen

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal

CERTEICATE OF SERVICE
I

correct
iCourl:

HEREBY CERTIFY

copy 0f the attached
File and Serve:

that

I

have

this 10th

day 0f December, 2019, served a true and
t0 the attorney listed below by means of

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

JENNY C. SWINFORD
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us.

_/s/

Kenneth K. Jorgensen

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

